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Perhaps more than any other body of international law, jus in bello-the
law of armed conflict-faces inherent and extraordinary stresses and
challenges. It is, of course, a law that goes directly to our own conceptions of
right and wrong, to the moral choices we make to constrain ourselves, our
friends, and our enemies in wartime, and to real questions of life and death.
The law of armed conflict reflects moral principles, but more than that, it is
binding law. In the words of one course book in the field:
[E]very humanitarian worker will confirm that when pleading the victims' cause with a
belligerent, be he or she a Head of State or a soldier at a roadblock, even the most basic
moral arguments encounter a vast variety of counter arguments based on the collective
and individual experience, the culture, religion, political opinions, and mood of those
addressed, while reference to international law singularly restricts the reserve of counter
arguments and, more importantly, puts all human beings, wherever they are and from
wherever they come, on the same level.'
The law of armed conflict is, above all, a vast framework of general
principles, specific laws, and detailed rules that matter. This framework stands
for the idea that the law can and should protect all persons caught up in war-
making the difference between life and death, between humanity and
inhumanity-whether they are civilians, prisoners of war (POWs), the
wounded, the sick, the hors d'combat, or soldiers on the battlefield.
Does the pattern of terrorist attacks followed by military response
support the notion that the law still matters? Just as the attacks of 9/11 sought
and accomplished the mass murder of American civilians and dozens of other
nations' citizens, they also sought to undermine civilized society's way of
seeing the world and attempting to govern it. They challenged us to uphold
our principles at a time of great fear and anger. This is not, however,
extraordinary. Because it applies only in times of armed conflict or its
aftermath, the law of armed conflict is particularly subject to abuse,
mischaracterization, politicization-and of course violation. When individual
and collective survival is at stake and passions run high, as they invariably do
at such times, parties to a conflict may look to any tool to gain an advantage.
These dynamics have stressed and strained the law of armed conflict
since September 11, 2001, but its basic framework has emerged in a strong
position, indeed without need for revision or amendment. This is perhaps
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because several difficult aspects of this body of law were clarified, and
therefore became more apt to be understood and implemented than in the past.
While one could draw many conclusions from the application of the law of
armed conflict since 9/11, the following are among the most salient for the
purposes of understanding where the law stands today and where it likely is
heading:
The law of armed conflict provides the most appropriate legal
framework for regulating the use of force in the war on terrorism. The
earliest international reactions to 9/11, beginning with the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1368 on September 12, 2001, and including the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) invocation of the Treaty's
Article V provision on collective self-defense, demonstrated widespread
recognition that the situation should be viewed as initiating an armed conflict.
It would have been difficult to predict such a reaction before 9/11. Yet
regarding these attacks as implicating the law of armed conflict reflected an
understanding that they were different in scale, effect, motivation, and
character from other terrorist acts.
The body of the law of armed conflict would thus apply-and, from a
U.S. perspective, there was never a question of not applying the law, or of
stepping away from international rules. In part, this ready recognition of the
applicability of the law of war was a reaffirmation of long-standing U.S.
policy to apply this law to its military operations, regardless of the
characterization of the conflict in which the operations take place. Most of all,
it was a recognition that our response would be rule-based. In a profound
sense this is the only appropriate response of civilized societies to the
barbarism of terrorism.
The application of the law of armed conflict, however, has confused
many observers. Few public debates have evidenced the understanding that if
the body of law would apply, we would also look to that body of law to
determine to whom it would be applicable and to what extent. This approach
has been controversial because the law of armed conflict itself disqualifies
some fighters and categories of people seeking to fight from claiming certain
privileges. But this is precisely what the law calls for, and it is a validation of
long-standing elemental principles of the law of armed conflict, in particular
distinguishing privileged from unprivileged belligerency.
Terrorists are belligerents who lack the entitlements of those
legitimately engaged in combat. No colorable argument has been put forward
that terrorists are entitled to any special status under the law of armed
conflict-and certainly not to the status of prisoners of war under the Third
Geneva Convention on the Protection of Prisoners of War ("GPW"). As a
group, terrorists willingly define and conduct themselves outside the coverage
of Article 4 of the GPW: They are neither members of the armed forces of a
State Party nor members of a "regular" armed force. Even if generously
considered, in the broadest sense, "irregulars" of some sort, they willfully and
maliciously fail to distinguish themselves from the civilian population, as
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impliedly required by the four conditions laid down in the 1907 Hague
Regulations and repeated in Article 4(A)(2) of the GPW. In fact, the core
aspect of terrorism is that its perpetrators fail on a systematic and willful basis
to conduct "their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war,"
as required by Article 4(A)(2)(d).
Putting aside the technicalities, it is important to recall why the
Convention lays down such specific criteria for determining which
combatants are entitled to the status of POW and the protections of the GPW.
As far back as the negotiations that led to the 1907 Hague Regulations, this
question has been of the utmost concern to states. Jean Pictet, in his famous
commentaries for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
called Article 4 of the GPW "in a sense the key to the Convention." 2 It is of
fundamental importance that Article 4, consistent with the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, imposes a distinction between the legitimate and
the illegitimate combatant-and while Article 4 expressly entitles the
legitimate soldier to the GPW's protections, its real beneficiaries are the
civilians who make up the mass of our societies. It requires soldiers to adhere
to certain basic principles, such as distinction and compliance with the law,
which serve first and foremost to protect civilian populations. The terrorist
flouts these basic rules and is a perfect example of why there are criteria to
separate lawful from unlawful combatants.
The purposes of the law of armed conflict are not advanced by granting
illegitimate fighters immunity for their belligerent acts, for that would
undermine the law's fundamental purpose, bring the entire body of law into
disrepute, and strip it of credibility. The positive incentives of the existing
normative system require that soldiers follow the rules and, most importantly,
distinguish combatants from civilians. To recognize terrorists as lawful
combatants would upend the entire system and cause predictably grim
humanitarian consequences.
Certain minimum standards apply to the detention of even
unprivileged belligerents-they are not "outside the law." Terrorists forfeit
any claim to POW status under the laws of armed conflict, but they do not
forfeit their right to humane treatment-a right that belongs to all humankind,
in war and in peace. It is a general principle of civilized societies that
inhumane treatment is cruel and unacceptable under any circumstance. Such
treatment degrades the perpetrator even as it inflicts unjustifiable harm on the
victim. The customary law of armed conflict innovated a structure to deal with
the situation of persons-like terrorists-who fall into "enemy" hands without
meeting the basic criteria of Article 4 of the GPW. Article 64 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention and articles which follow it reflect this system and the
desire of states to ensure a protective "safety-net" for persons, including
enemy combatants without POW status, in occupied territory. More broadly,
this customary law notion of fundamental guarantees found more expansive
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expression in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
While the United States has major objections to parts of Additional Protocol I,
it does regard the provisions of Article 75 as an articulation of safeguards to
which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled.
The law of armed conflict constrains and, if necessary, sanctions
privileged and unprivileged belligerents. If U.S. policy since 9/11 has
confirmed that terrorists lack the basic characteristics to be considered lawful
belligerents entitled to status under the GPW, it has also confirmed that the
restraints and sanctions of the law apply to both lawful and unlawful
belligerents. The President's Military Order of November 13, 2001, for
instance, indicates that such persons may be held responsible for violations of
the laws of armed conflict. This is in keeping with the grave breach provisions
of the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, as well as tribunal
decisions concerning the law of armed conflict, which do not require that a
perpetrator be a lawful combatant in order to commit unlawful acts. Indeed,
how could it be otherwise? The law would not exempt unlicensed drivers from
liability for violations of the rules of the road.
The law applicable to the means and methods of warfare applies
whenever armed forces employ military force, however the conflict is
characterized. The U.S. military, in its actions since 9/11, has assiduously
adhered to the traditional rules associated with the use of military force, laid
out in the Hague Regulations of 1907 and in customary international law.
Some of these traditional rules are reflected in the 1980 Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the 1954 Hague Convention on the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (and its
Second Protocol of 1999), and elements of the Additional Protocols of 1977,
including Articles 48 to 52 and Article 57. In particular, the United States has
carefully selected only military objectives as the targets of attack and has
sought in every instance to avoid or minimize civilian casualties, calling off
attacks where the risk of civilian casualties was assessed to be too great. And
this has been the case whether the conflict may be considered an international
one, an internal one, or, in the layman's terms, a war against terrorism.
In fact, the United States, just months after its military campaign
commenced in Afghanistan, pressed successfully for an expansion of the rules
contained in the CCW so that they apply not only in international armed
conflicts but in others as well. 3 The attacks of 9/1 1-attacks that violated
every principle of the law of armed conflict-met a striking response from the
coalition arrayed against terrorism: we have not responded in kind, and
instead are carefully, discriminately, and lawfully rooting out the terrorists,
and debunking and undermining their modes of operation in the process.
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Terrorism is, above all, the negation of law. More specifically, it is the
negation of the fundamental humanitarian principles of the law of armed
conflict. Whereas humanitarian law proscribes directing attacks against
civilians as such, terrorism promotes it; and whereas a fundamental purpose of
jus in bello is the facilitation of order after a conflict, the aim of terrorism is
the opposite-chaos clad in violence. The attacks of September 11 shocked
the United States into an instant military campaign, but they also clarified for
the world community the elemental considerations of humanity that lie at the
heart of the law of armed conflict. Application of the law of armed conflict,
and in particular its bedrock principles of distinction and fundamental
protections, serves humanitarian ends and ultimately reinforces the rules
governing international behavior at all times, even in war.

